> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.stable.xyz/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Bridge security and DVNs > Understand how Stable configures LayerZero DVNs to verify cross-chain messages and what makes a single key compromise non-fatal. A LayerZero bridge is only as secure as the verification layer that confirms a message sent on one chain happened on another. That layer is a Decentralized Verifier Network (DVN). This page explains what DVNs do, how Stable configures them on its bridges, and why a compromise of any single DVN does not put Stable at risk. ## How DVNs work When a LayerZero message moves from chain A to chain B, the destination contract does not execute it until a configured set of DVNs independently attests that the message is real. Each application picks its own configuration: * **Required DVNs.** Every required DVN must sign before the message is accepted. * **Optional DVNs with an N-of-M threshold.** An optional pool can be added on top of the required set, with a threshold like 2-of-5 that must be met in addition to required signatures. * **Block confirmation depth.** The number of source-chain confirmations DVNs wait for before signing. The safety of a bridge is entirely a function of this configuration. A 1/1 setup with a single DVN as the sole verifier means any compromise of that one DVN's signing key allows an attacker to forge cross-chain messages. A 3/3 across three independent operators requires all three to be compromised simultaneously. The difference is the difference between losing a bridge to a single stolen key and surviving a targeted attack on one operator. ## Stable's configuration Stable's bridges run a **3/3 required DVN** configuration with three independent operators: **LayerZero Labs**, **Canary**, and **Horizen**. All three must sign every cross-chain message before the destination contract will execute it. There is no optional pool with a threshold; the required set is the entire verification surface. A single compromised signing key, including LayerZero's own, does nothing against this posture. Forging a message would require simultaneous compromise of all three independent operators. For DVN contract addresses, see [Bridges: Stable's DVN operators](/en/reference/bridges#stable-s-dvn-operators). ## STABLE OFT architecture The STABLE token bridges to other chains using LayerZero's Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) standard. Two contract types are deployed: * **`StableOFTAdapter`** on Stable. The adapter locks STABLE on the home chain and emits a LayerZero message when STABLE is sent cross-chain. * **`StableOFTUpgradeable`** on each remote chain. This contract mints STABLE on the destination when the message is verified by the configured DVNs, and burns it on the return path so the home-chain supply remains canonical. For deployed addresses on each chain, see [Bridges: STABLE OFT contracts](/en/reference/bridges#stable-oft-contracts). ## Operational dependencies Stable's own bridge security is independent of upstream protocols, but cross-chain flow through Stable can still pause when partner protocols pause their own bridges. For example, when USDT0 pauses cross-chain mint and burn, USDT0 cannot move to or from Stable until USDT0 resumes. Funds within Stable continue to move freely; only the specific cross-chain action is unavailable. Application surfaces routing through partner bridges should communicate this clearly so users understand the distinction: their funds are not at risk, only that a particular cross-chain path is temporarily unavailable. ## Next recommended See how USDT0 reaches Stable through the OFT Mesh and Legacy Mesh. Reference contract addresses, DVN operators, and supported bridge providers. Read LayerZero's spec for required and optional DVN verification.